

The Past in the Future Assessment of the Events of 1940 in Latvia

2005

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Address to Members of the European Parliament

Honourable Members of the European Parliament,

A year ago, the process of enlargement of the European Union offered opportunities for a range of states and peoples to participate again wholesomely in the political, cultural and economic processes of Europe. There are the first cognitions, transformations, hopes and disappointments for both, the new and the old EU states. It proves that there are still many things we do not know about each other, and there are many things that we have to and will have to know about and understand anew.

Such is the reality. Extension of democratic space cannot automatically solve problems caused to Eastern European countries as a result of totalitarian communistic regime, which has lasted for 50 years. However, it does not justify the evident truth that a range of problems urgent for the new EU states and their peoples are still viewed superficially. At times it even seems that instead of understanding and support one may discern a deliberative, pragmatic and solidary ignorance at the highest level of democratic Europe!

The case of the Baltic States, which have greatly suffered during the years of the Soviet occupation, is a particularly evident example! Endeavours to attain international recognition of historical truth about damages caused to these as a result of multiple occupations by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany have pretty often ended with recommendations from democratic Europe not to drag up issues of the past but instead to dedicate oneself to shaping of future.

Nevertheless, in January this year the State President of Latvia Vaira Vike-Freiberga introduced the leaders of national governments with evaluation of final consequences of World War II related to the state of Latvia and its residents, indicating that the end of this war did not bring freedom to the Baltic States, but continued the Soviet occupational regime causing irretrievable moral and material damages. During the last months, such internationally well-known politicians like T. Blair, J. Circa, G. Schroeder, G. Bush, J. De Hoop Schaffer have admitted the truthfulness of these facts.

The position of Russia, the legal successor of the former occupying state, the USSR, which stubbornly continues to deny the fact of occupation of the Baltic States, stand out in a sharp contrast on the background of these conclusions.

Can the European Union and we, representatives of European peoples, accept this? And moreover can we agree that Russia is still using political conquests of the occupational regime to make a brutish pressure upon the Baltic States?

Dear colleagues,

At the plenary session in Strasbourg in May it is planned to discuss the results of WWII and the necessity of preventing its consequences within the context of the future of Europe. With the aim to stress the urgency of these problems, with support of the European Parliament UEN group, together with specialists of the Advanced Institute of Social and Political Research (ASPRI) at the University of Latvia I have prepared a set of materials, which prove from the legal aspect how the fate of Latvia, a member state of the League of Nations, was decided on the eve of WWII. The study reminds us not only of the historical truth itself, but also evaluates the facts from the viewpoint of international law. I consider that the study will be a good concise insight that will form your opinion about the crimes committed against the State of Latvia and the society around the time of WWII.

Girts Valdis Kristovskis MEP, UEN Group, Latvia April, 2005

Foreword

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People's attitude towards history can be in a sense described in two ways. A popular opinion is that there is no future without history. Another one, in turn, declares that too frequent looking over the shoulder becomes a hindrance to advancing forward, an obstacle to development.

One might get the impression at first sight that these interpretations of the meaning of history are contradictory and even mutually exclusive. In fact, they actually supplement each other as they reflect development of time and processes – from yesterday through this day to tomorrow.

It cannot be denied that exploration of the historical heritage plays a great role in Latvia. But it is not a peculiar mentality of people living in the country, but an attitude towards one's family, society, state, and neighbours caused by objective conditions. If we choose the years before Christ was born as our point of reference, when our ancestors started to settle at the Baltic Sea, then, during the period of more than 1500 years, Latvians and others having lived in this territory have been owners of their own state only for 37 years, with all the attributes appropriate to it.

The Republic of Latvia, which existed from 1918 till 1940, managed to attain considerable achievements in economy, education and culture, and the public administration within a short period of time. The occupation of 1940 and the events following it not only caused the loss of the national independence, but also disintegration of the existing state and social structures because of artificial and unconsidered industrialisation, forcible and violent change of the ethnic structure, subjection of economy to the logic of Moscow, and liquidation of people. At the end of WWII, occupation continued in Latvia with all the consequences resulting from it.

Almost every family living in Latvia, independent of its ethnic origin, has suffered during the occupational regime. The historical and legal term "occupation" has many nuances and associations. These are the lost families, the divested places of habitation, the long years of exile, the lost state, the forbidden Latvian language and culture. However, it is exactly the young generation for which it is relatively easier to evaluate historical events, as they are not reprimanded of an emotionally or psychologically biased attitude towards the past. This is why the analysis of the 1940 events was handed over to several young scientists of Latvia, to allow them to offer their opinions on the occupation of Latvia and the consequences caused by it from historical, political, legal and public opinion aspects.

Anda Bimbere, Ivars Indāns, Kristīne Krūma, Toms Rostoks and Ieva Strode have carried out an extensive study of the impact of occupation upon various spheres of social life. This can be considered an essential investment in promoting the discussion about the influence of historical events on the life of a state, society and individual. This publication comprises only summaries reflecting the major conclusions the authors have drawn. The edition is supplemented by annexes that permit the drawing of wider conclusions on the influence of history on human minds, attitudes, values, as well as in mass media on the basis of particular documents and facts. This is the first study in Latvia which has been performed using an interdisciplinary methodology to evaluate occupation.

The study project has been performed by the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI) at the University of Latvia, with the support of the European Parliament, Union for Europe of the Nations, and the creative participation of Girts Valdis Kristovskis. A great support was offered to the young researchers by the scientific editors of the project, Inta Brikše and Ilgvars Butulis.

Prof. *Žaneta Ozoliņa* Project Director

Chapter 1

Occupation of Latvia in 1940: Historical Aspects

The goal of the chapter is to provide a concentrated review of the major historical events with the purpose of describing the occupation of Latvia in 1940. Characteristics of the relations between Latvia and the Soviet Union in the period from 1920 to 1939 are provided in the first part. The second part describes the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact as the document that established the basis for the occupation of Latvia, while the third part contains a short review of the occupation procedure of Latvia and the following annexation in 1939 and in 1940.

Relations between Latvia and the Soviet Union until 1939

Soviet Russia was the first country to recognise the independence of the Baltic States, and the Baltic States were among the first ones to recognise the Soviet Union *de jure'*. The peace treaty concluded on 11 August 1920 served as a basis for further development of relations between Latvia and Russia. The treaty was based on the recognition of national independence of both parties and the non-intervention in internal matters of the other state. The treaty not only pointed out that Russia recognized the independence of Latvia, but also that Russia renounced, of its own accord and forever, all sovereign rights which it had towards the Latvian people and the country².

The acts of mutual recognition between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States could have served as a basis for close mutual relations, but the Soviet government continued to consider the Baltic States as forcibly separated from it. The situation was aggravated by the collapse of the Soviet governments in the Baltic States. The Soviet Union developed two contradictory policies towards the Baltic States. The first one tended to maintain formal friendly relations, while the other one supported the communist movement in the Baltic States and strove to demolish their administrative systems.³

It can be said that even the relatively favourable Peace Treaty of 11 August 1920 between Latvia and Soviet Russia may be considered a necessity dictated by the circumstances and the weakness of the latter. In the twenties, the relations between the Baltic States and Soviet Russia gradually worsened as the latter tried to create appropriate conditions for coup d'etat in the Baltic States including the attempted coup d'etat in Estonia in 1924⁴.

On 5 February 1932, a bilateral treaty was signed between Latvia and the Soviet Union on non-aggression and settlement of conflicts in a peaceful manner⁵. By that time the Soviet Union had succeeded in convincing its neighbouring countries of having no territorial ambitions. Most of the researchers of the time were also of the opinion that with the conclusion of the 1932 treaty a new phase had started in the relations between the Baltics and the Soviet Union, characterised by stabilization of relations in entire Eastern Europe⁶.

In 1935 and 1936, the general attitude in Latvia towards the Soviet Union was that the USSR was a warrant of peace and security for small nations. However, the mood changed in the following years. Merciless cleansing campaigns ruined the USSR's reputation. The first rumours surfaced in 1936 that the USSR and Germany might reach a mutual agreement by dividing the geopolitical space between these two super powers⁷.

¹ Andersons, E. Latvijas vēsture. 1920 – 1940. Ārpolitīka. Daugava, Zviedrija, 1982, 74. lpp.

² Stranga, A. Latvijas – padomju Krievijas miera līgums 1920. gada 11. augustā. Latvijas – padomju Krievijas attiecības 1919.–1925. gadā. Žurnāla "Latvijas Vēsture" fonds, Rīga, 2000, 258. lpp.

³ Andersons, E. Latvijas vēsture. 1920.–1940. Ārpolitīka. Daugava, Zviedrija, 1982, 74. lpp.

⁴ Ibid., 97. lpp.

⁵ Latvijas un Padomju Sociālistisko Republiku Savienības neuzbrukšanas līgums. 05.02.1932.

⁶ Rutenberg, G. The Baltic States and the Soviet Union. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1935, p. 598.

⁷ Andersons, E. Latvijas vēsture. 1920.–1940. Ārpolitīka, op.cit., 491. lpp.

The non-aggression treaty and its inseparable part, the secret protocol known also as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (see Annex 2), signed between the USSR and Nazi Germany on 23 August 1939 "was an illegitimate and cynical bargain, reconciliation at the expense of the third countries. It split Eastern Europe into German and Soviet zones of influence."⁸

As late as August 1939, France and the Great Britain were still trying to persuade the Soviet Union to establish a common block in order to restrain Nazi Germany. Initially, negotiations among the super powers were based on mutual co-operation against the aggressive foreign policy of Nazi Germany. However, as the Soviet Union would only be content with guarantees that would allow the occupation of the Baltic States, France and the Great Britain subsequently had to shift focus to the protection of the Baltic States against the interests of the USSR⁹. Although the negotiations were formally still taking place in August 1939, the USSR was no longer interested in reaching an agreement with France and the Great Britain, as another agreement with Nazi Germany was secretly being prepared.

The agreement between Nazi Germany and the USSR was concluded because the former needed neutrality from the USSR as it was preparing to attack Poland. In return for its neutral policy concerning the issue of Poland, the USSR received not only the Baltic States, but also Bessarabia, Eastern Poland and the Ukraine. Hitler had planned to attack Poland on 26 August, and Stalin used Germany's haste in his favour. The USSR gained the entire territory of the Baltic States although initially Germany had planned to split the Baltic States into spheres of interest with the river Daugava (in Latvia) as the envisaged borderline.¹⁰ Both parties agreed that the Pact would be treated strictly confidentially¹¹.

The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact gave the green light to start World War II, and it was on 1 September 1939 that Germany attacked Poland. It was in contradiction to the international law valid at the time; in addition, the USSR and Germany, by concluding the Pact, violated also several other bilateral and multilateral treaties. The secret protocol of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact did not directly change the international legal status of Latvia and other countries. However, the determination of spheres of interest questioned the basic sovereignty of Latvia, Estonia, and Finland¹². Both superpowers agreed that the term "sphere of interest" meant freedom to occupy and annex the territories of the states named in the secret document. The term was used in the secret protocol in order to solve the "problem" related to Poland and the Baltic States.¹³ Realising the transformation to be expected in the territory of the Baltics which was placed within the sphere of interest of the USSR, the German government decided to relocate people of German nationality from these states to its own sphere of interest.¹⁴

Years 1939 and 1940: Occupation and annexation of Latvia

In the autumn of 1939, after the military defeat of Poland, the Soviet Union gradually started taking possession of the territories allocated to it. Estonia was chosen to be the first target. On 24 September 1939, the Soviet Union presented an ultimatum demanding the presence of the Red Army troops in the territory of Estonia, which was justified by the necessity for security of the Soviet Union. After brief negotiations, Estonia decided to accept the agreement proposed by the USSR, which was then signed in Moscow on 28 September.

In the beginning of October 1939, the USSR pressured Latvia into signing the mutual assistance agreement. The main request of the Soviet Union was a permission to establish military bases in strategically important Latvian cities and to station its armed forces in Latvia. The agreement of 5 October 1939 (see Appendix 1) included references to the Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Mutual Non-aggression Treaty of 1932; nevertheless, Latvia lost its national independence and freedom to a great extent¹⁵. "Recognition of national independence" or "non-interfer-

⁸ Feldmanis, I. Latvijas okupācija: vēsturiskie un starptautiski tiesiskie aspekti. Latvijas Vēsture, 56. sēj., 4. nr., 2004, 86. lpp.

⁹ 20. gadsimta Latvijas vēsture. II. Sējums. Neatkarīgā valsts. 1918.–1940. Red. Bērziņš, V. Latvijas Vēstures institūta apgāds, Rīga, 2003, 702. lpp.

¹⁰ Ibid., 706. lpp.

¹¹ Vācijas un PSRS 1939. gada 23. augusta neuzbrukšanas līguma slepenais papildus protokols.. 23.08.1939.

¹² Feldmanis, I. Latvijas okupācija: vēsturiskie un starptautiski tiesiskie aspekti, op.cit., 87. lpp.

¹³ Ibid., 87. lpp.

¹⁴ Okupācijas varu politika Latvijā. 1939.–1991. Red. Pelkaus, E. Collected documents. Rīga, 1999, 61. lpp.

¹⁵ 20. gadsimta Latvijas vēsture. II. Sējums. Neatkarīgā valsts. 1918.–1940, op.cit., 711. lpp.



ence into internal matters of the opposite party" stressed in the treaties was of little help as these treaties were designed as a prelude to occupation, given the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union. An alternative to the agreement of 1939 was a war with the Soviet Union, because it was clear that the Soviet Union would attack.¹⁶ The government of Latvia did not choose this option.

While, the government of Latvia still enjoyed certain sovereignty in the management of economics and its internal policy, manoeuvring opportunities were very scarce in its foreign policy as the Soviet military forces, navy and air force were already located in Latvia.¹⁷ That Latvia was no longer able to develop an independent foreign policy was evidenced by the fact that Latvia did not participate in the international sanctions against the Soviet Union in December of 1939, brought about by its attack on Finland.

In 1940, Nazi Germany attacked Denmark and Norway in April, Holland and Belgium in May, and France later. Germany concentrated its forces in Western Europe, thus leaving the Soviet Union free to fulfil its plans regarding the Baltic States. Stalin chose a successful time for occupying the Baltic States as the attention of the entire world was focused on Paris, to which German military forces quickly advanced.

The Soviet government decided on complete occupation of the Baltic States in June 1940. Lithuania was chosen as the first target. On the night of 15 June using fabricated accusations, Moscow presented an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding an establishment of a new government and a permission of more Soviet troops to enter Lithuania. The Lithuanian government felt forced to accept the ultimatum without resistance and protest. In turn, the occupation of Latvia and the following annexation on 15 June 1940 was triggered by an incident on the Latvian–Russian border at Maslenky on 15 June. In the early morning hours, Soviet border guards attacked the Latvian guards. Three guards, a guard's wife and son were shot dead and almost 40 persons, including civilians, were taken across the border.¹⁸

On the afternoon of 16 June, the government of the USSR presented an ultimatum to Latvia (see Annex 3). The main accusation against Latvia was the alleged establishment of a military union of the Baltic States against the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Such statements by the Soviet Union that the Baltic States had established a tripartite military agreement was ungrounded, as Lithuania had not joined this treaty²⁰. In addition, V. Munters, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia noted that the government of the USSR had no objections against existence of the Defence Pact of Latvia and Estonia when concluding the mutual assistance agreement in 1939²¹.

In the ultimatum the Soviet government demanded that Latvia immediately establish a new government which would be capable and ready implement the Latvia–USSR Mutual Assistance Pact signed on 5 October 1939 and to allow the Soviet army to be stationed at the most important centres of Latvia to assist with the implementation of the Pact and to prevent possible provocative acts against Soviet forces²².

The Soviet government demanded a reply on the same day, a Sunday, by 11:00 p.m. The government of Latvia was given 8 hours for consideration. Paradoxically, only a few days before V. Molotov, the USSR People's Commissary of Foreign Affairs had announced that the relations between Latvia and Russia were good²³. The Latvian government convened only at the evening of 16 June, and it decided that Latvia would yield to both demands by the Soviet Union²⁴ (see Annex 4). The first Soviet tanks appeared on Riga streets already in the afternoon of the following day. The newly established People's government lead by A. Kirhensteins started its work on 21 June, although the real masters of the situation were A. Vishinsky, the plenipotentiary of the USSR, the USSR embassy and the Red Army.

¹⁶ Feldmanis, I. Latvijas okupācija: vēsturiskie un starptautiski tiesiskie aspekti, op.cit., 88. lpp.

¹⁷ Ibid., 88. lpp.

¹⁸ Latvijas Robežsargu brigādes kapteiņa Holandera Telefonogramma Nr. A 11-851 par uzbrukumu Latvijas robežsardzes III Abrenes bataljona 2. sardzes mītnei Masļenkos. 15.06.1940.

¹⁹ Grava-Kreituse, I., Feldmanis, I., Goldmanis, J., Stranga, A. Latvijas okupācija un aneksija 1939.–1940. *Dokumenti un materiāli*. Rīga, 1995, Nr. 143, 340.–342. lpp.

²⁰ Latvijas sūtņa Padomju Savienībā F. Kociņa pārskats par sarunām ar PSRS ārlietu tautas komisāru V. Molotovu 1940. gada 16. jūnijā. 21.06.1940.

²¹ Vācijas sūtņa Latvijā U. fon Koces telegramma nr. 258 Vācijas Ārlietu ministrijai. 17.06.1940.

²² Ibid.

²³ Latvijas sūtņa Padomju Savienībā F. Kociņa pārskats par sarunām ar PSRS ārlietu tautas komisāru V.Molotovu 1940. gada 16. jūnijā. 21.06.1940.

²⁴ Latvijas Ministru kabineta sēdes protokols nr. 40. 16.06.1940.

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In the beginning of July, the People's Government announced parliamentary elections, which took place on 14 and 15 July. Elections were organised in 10 days in order to limit the possible opposition. In addition, only one list was registered for the elections, the list of Working People's Block (the communist party). A list of Democratic Latvian Voters was also submitted, but was refused for formal reasons. The members of the list were soon repressed as they demanded a free and independent Latvia²⁵. Official results of the elections showed an inordinately large turnout of voters. Compared to the total of valid votes registered for all the lists during the previous parliamentary elections, there were additional 188,587 votes allegedly cast for Working People's Block of Latvia²⁶.

Subsequent events unfolded quickly. The newly elected People's Parliament convened on 21 July. A decision to join the USSR was adopted immediately. From a legal point of view it was illegitimate as a question of such a crucial importance could only be decided by a referendum. In addition, it can be concluded from the apparently falsified voting results, that the forum that took this decision was elected fraudulently. Thus Latvia's "joining" of the USSR is to be considered illegitimate. On 5 August Latvia as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Latvia was admitted into the Soviet Union²⁷.

Several thousands of people were arrested during the first days of occupation. Repressions continued until the beginning of WWII. Members of the government, army officers, officials of public administration, representatives of economic elite, clergymen, editors of newspapers and public figures were arrested within the first few days. Further repressions were aimed at the rest of the population. The largest deportations took place during the nights of 13 and 14 June, 1941 when about 15,000 people were rounded up and deported from Latvia. Overall, about 35,000 people, accounting for approximately 2% of the state's population, were deported or killed during what Latvians refer to as the "horrible" year.²⁸ The" horrible" year ended towards the end of June 1941 when Latvia was completely occupied by the military forces of Nazi Germany.

Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to describe the Soviet occupation of Latvia in June of 1940 by the use of historical facts. The authors of the work consider that the fact of occupation and annexation is proven by all the factors mentioned: by the policy of the USSR towards Latvia since the beginning of the 1920s; by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 which openly disregarded the sovereignty of Latvia; by the Mutual Assistance Treaty forced upon Latvia on 5 October 1939 and the following period when Latvia was no longer able to realize an independent foreign policy; by Soviet provocations on the Latvian–Russian border on 15 June 1940 prior to submission of the ultimatum to the government of Latvia; by the falsified elections of the People's Parliament; by the subsequent admittance of Latvia into the Soviet Union; and, finally, by the repressive Soviet measures towards the people of Latvia during its occupation until the arrival of German troops in Latvia at the end of June 1941.

²⁷ Okupācijas varu politika Latvijā. 1939.–1991, op.cit., 62. lpp.

²⁵ Demokrātisko latviešu vēlētāju saraksta Saeimas vēlēšanu platforma. 05.–08.07.1940.

²⁶ Centrālās vēlēšanu komisijas priekšsēdētāja A. Buševica ziņojums par Saeimas vēlēšanu rezultātiem Saeimas sēdē. 23.07.1940.

²⁸ Mangulis, V. Latvia in the Wars of the 20th Century. Cognition Books, Princeton Junction, 1983, p. 93.

Chapter 2

Legal Aspects of the 1940 Events in Latvia

On the basis of the historical facts presented in the first part of this investigation, from the legal point of view two material aspects result which unambiguously show that Latvia's occupation and annexation in 1940 was in breach of international law. The second part relates to the international legal regulation applicable to legal relations between Latvia and the USSR. In addition, in this section the main counter arguments that are raised in relation to the unlawful occupation of Latvia will be mentioned and refuted.

Continuity of the Latvian State

Continuity of the Baltic States in international law results not only from Latvia's claim, but also from recognition of this claim by other countries. It was certified both by the countries which recognised Latvia's *de jure* independence during the time of occupation and by several international organisations which adopted relevant decisions and resolutions.

Latvia's de iure recognition in 1940 to 1990

Most countries did not recognise the annexation of the Baltic States *de jure*. Many countries particularly stressed the unchangeability and continuity of a non-recognition policy²⁹. Even the attitude of the countries that had recognised the annexation *de jure* and/or *de facto*, could not be considered final. By the end of 1980s this was particularly true with respect to the countries of the "socialist camp" of the Eastern Europe in which free and democratic elections had not taken place.³⁰

On a multilateral level, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted resolution No 189 on 20 September 1960 on the situation in the Baltic States in relation to the 20th anniversary of their violent incorporation in the Soviet Union, in which it was stressed that the unlawful annexation has taken place against the wish of the nations. It expressed sympathy with sufferings of the Baltic nations and promised support of the European nations.³¹ The Resolution confirmed the *de jure* status of the Baltic States. Another resolution on the Baltic issue was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 28 January 1987.

The Baltic issue was activated again at the multilateral forum in August 1975 when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe took place in Helsinki and the Final Act³² was signed. In this document the USSR for the first time proposed to promote the unchangeability of borders as the principle for cooperation of countries. However, in order to prevent the attempts of the Soviet government to interpret signing of such a document as recognition of the unchangeability of borders of the Soviet Union,³³ the Western countries insisted that along with the principle of unchangeability of borders the document would include the principle of self-determination which in its turn denoted the unlawfulness of the Western borders of the USSR.

On 13 January 1983 the European Parliament also adopted a resolution in which it gave a comprehensive list of the legal and historical facts related to occupation of the Baltic States and international reaction to this event. In the resolution it was pointed out that the Soviet annexation is not recognised by the largest part of the European States, the USA, Canada and Australia.³⁴

²⁹ Dokumenti par Latvijas Valsts starptautisko atzīšanu, neatkarības atjaunošanas un diplomātiskajiem sakariem, 1918–1998. Nordik, Rīga, 1999, 147. lpp The USA was among the most assertive states that did not recognize the occupation of Latvia. The reaction of the USA regarding the Helsinki Final Act (see the main text) is a good example of that. The USA House of Representatives (13 November 1975) passed two resolutions that stated that the USA continues to recognize sovereign and independent Baltic states and that the CSCE's signed Helsinki Final Act in no way changed the long-term policy of the USA of non-recognition of the USSR's illegal seizure and anexation of the Baltic states.

³⁰ Ibid.,147. lpp.

³¹ Ibid,160. lpp.

³² Available at http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm. Viewed on 06.01.2005.

³³ Dokumenti par Latvijas Valsts starptautisko atzīšanu, neatkarības atjaunošanas un diplomātiskajiem sakariem, 1918–1998, op.cit., 159. lpp.

³⁴ Ibid., 161. lpp.



Recognition of the Latvian State after 1990

After 1990, when the Baltic States regained independence most of the states that had never recognised Latvia's incorporation in the USSR announced re-establishing of diplomatic relations.

The most significant international organisations also recognised continuity of the Baltic States. Admittance of the Baltic States to the UN took place in accordance with the procedure set out in the UN Statutes, i.e. by vote in the Security Council and General Assembly. When the Security Council reviewed the issue, its President referred to the regained independence of the Baltic States.³⁵ The UN also confirmed statements of the three Baltic States that they were not successors of the Soviet Union in relation to multilateral treaties and that they could decide themselves which of the treaties they would join. None of the UN member states objected.³⁶ The European Council, when reviewing applications of the Baltic States for membership in the organisation, confirmed that they had fully re-established their independence.³⁷

Thus, there is a basis for the assertion that the international community, in principle, supported the claim of the Baltic States for continuity that resulted from non-recognition of their occupation and annexation.³⁸

Treatment of the 1940 events as violation of international law

In accordance with Kellogg-Brian Pact of 1928 which both Latvia and the USSR joined, countries renounced war as an instrument of their national policy.³⁹ These documents forbade using war; however, they did not exclude possibilities of using violence, or threat of violence. Nevertheless, both Latvia and the USSR joined the Convention adopted in 1933 for definition of aggression that absolutely forbade using violence, either directly or indirectly, in the relations among countries; thus, they confirmed that they would undertake not to use either violence or threat of violence.

In addition to international legal prohibitions against the use of various types of violence or threat, there existed bilateral agreements that prohibited the use of violence or threat of violence. As the first treaty of the kind, the Peace Treaty of 1920 signed between Latvia and Russia deserves mention. Per this treaty, both countries forever relinquished claims against each other and undertook to respect each other's sovereignty and independence. The second most significant treaty between Latvia and the Soviet Union was the nonaggression pact signed in 1932. In accordance with Article 1 of this Pact, both countries agreed to refrain from any aggression and any acts of violence against the political independence of the other party. For interpreting the above-mentioned terms, the Convention of 1932 on conciliation procedure concluded between Latvia and the Soviet Union should be taken into account. In accordance with Article 1 of this Convention the contracting parties undertake to settle all kinds of disputes by conciliation procedures in the conciliation committee including disputes with respect to fulfilment of treaties. Thus, the USSR, by issuing its ultimatum for enforcement of the Pact of Defence and Mutual Assistance, did not comply with its duty to settle disputes first of all by means of conciliation.⁴⁰

³⁵ Ziemele, I. State Continuity, Human Rights, and Nationality in the Baltic States. In: *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads*, 2nd ed. Jundzis, T. (ed.). Latvian Academy of Sciences, Riga, 2001, p. 231.

³⁶ Ibid. It must be noted that the payment designated to the Baltic countries was initially calculated as a portion of the USSR's payment As a result of this the payment of Latvia into the budget of the UN more than four times exceeded the real financial capacity of Latvia. The Baltic states objected to these calculations, but as a result of the financial crisis of the UN and the inertia of the other UN member states, the solving of the issue was delayed. For more detailed information see: Indāns, I., Gregors, R.V. *Latvijas ārpolitika ANO ietvaros*. Latvijas Ārpolitikas Institūts, Rīga, 1999.

³⁷ With the Declaration of Independence of 21 August 1991 and the reinstatement of the 1922 Constitution, a framework for parliamentary democracy in Latvia was re-established. Parliamentary Assembly Opinion No. 183 (1995) on the application by Latvia for membership of the Council of Europe. Available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA95/Eopi183.htm. Viewed on 02.01.2005.

³⁸ Dokumenti par Latvijas Valsts starptautisko atzišanu, neatkarības atjaunošanas un diplomātiskajiem sakariem, 1918–1998, op.cit., 208. lpp.; Ziemele, I. Valsts nepārtrauktības un cilvēktiesību loma pilsonības kontekstā Baltijas valstīs. Baltijas valstīs liktengriežos. Red. Jundzis, T. Latvijas Zinātņu akadēmija, Rīga, 1998, 240.–242. lpp.

³⁹ Löbers, D.A. Latvijas valsts bojāeja 1940. gadā. Starptautiski tiesiskie aspekti. Grām.: Latvijas valsts atjaunošana 1986-1993. Red. Blūzma, V., Celle, O., Jundzis, T., Löbers, D.A., Levits, E., Zile, L. Žurnāla "Latvijas Vösture" fonds, Rīga, 1998, 7.–41. lpp., 11. lpp.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 12. lpp. The obligation to reach a settlement was confirmed in the Mutual Agreement Pact of 1939, for the breach of which the USSR blamed Latvia.



By Latvia's annexation and incorporation, the government of the Soviet Union attempted to act in accordance with the national law since it was essential for it that all decisions are as if made by local governments on the basis of citizens' wishes.⁴¹ In spite of this, the national legislation of the time was brutally violated. The violations were not only with respect to the organisation and course of the elections and amnesty but also to the Satversme (Constitution)⁴². The most essential was the violation of Article 1 of Satversme which held that Latvia was an independent Republic. To amend it, a national referendum (Article 77 of Satversme) was required; however, no referendum was organised.

From the above arguments it follows that the Soviet Union acted unlawfully with regard to international law by violating the multilateral and bilateral treaties and general judicial principles that guaranteed the independence of the Baltic States.⁴³ This is also evidenced by the reaction of the international community to the events in the Baltic States.⁴⁴

Counterarguments stated against occupation and annexation

Voluntary consent of Latvia to the USSR activities

Professor S. Chernichenko points that none of the occupation events recognised by the international law can be related to the Baltic States, as they have had no war relations with Russia⁴⁵. The same refers to annexation, Chernichenko concludes that, although in accordance with international law of the time annexation resulting from war was considered a violation, the Baltic States had formally agreed to bringing of the USSR military forces into their territory, and there had been no armed conflict among the states. The army was brought in only after the Baltic States met the demands of the Russian ultimatum, which had been submitted for enforcement of the 1939 treaty.⁴⁶ Although ultimatums might be considered to be a violation of the present international law, they did not violate the international law of 1940⁴⁷.

Such legal qualification of the events is possible by completely ignoring the bilateral obligations of the treaty, which existed between Latvia and Russia in 1939, in particular the Nonaggression Treaty of 1932. Reference to this Treaty refutes the argument of Russia that international law did not yet forbid the use of power at the time. In the first clause of the Treaty both states resolved to refrain from any "actions of violence".⁴⁸ In addition, Russian researchers neither substantiate non-use of the Convention of 1932 on conciliation procedure nor explain in what way Latvia has violated the Pact of Defence and Mutual Assistance of 1939.

Absence of violence threat and insignificance of secret protocols

According to Chernichenko, in any case such annexation did not contradict the international law valid in 1940. The principle, which forbade the use of violence or the threat of violence to challenge the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, did not exist at the time. Also the secret protocols, which discussed only spheres of interest, did not turn annexation into occupation⁴⁹.

While putting forth these arguments, the Russian professor fails to take into account the bilateral agreements. In addition, most of the countries and international organisations, which had censured the action of the USSR in the Baltic States during the time of occupation did not agree with his interpretation regarding the secret protocols and the way the Soviet regime was established in Latvia.

⁴¹ Ziemele, I. State Continuity, Succession and Responsibility: Reparation to the Baltic States and their Peoples? *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, Kluwer Law International, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 168.–169.

⁴² Lēbers, D.A. Latvijas valsts bojāeja 1940. gadā. Starptautiski tiesiskie aspekti, op.cit., 22., 28. lpp.

⁴³ Dokumenti par Latvijas Valsts starptautisko atzīšanu, neatkarības atjaunošanas un diplomātiskajiem sakariem, 1918–1998, op.cit., 162. lpp.; Ziemele, I. State Continuity, Human Rights, and Nationality in the Baltic States, op.cit., 224.–249., 227. lpp.

⁴⁴ Dokumenti par Latvijas Valsts starptautisko atzīšanu, neatkarības atjaunošanas un diplomātiskajiem sakariem, 1918–1998, op.cit., 139. lpp ⁴⁵ Черниченко С. Собития в Прибалтике 1940 года как предлог для дискриминации русскоязычного населения. Междурадная жизнь,

Москва, 3, 1998, с. 64; Черниченко С. Об ДОккупации" Прибалтики и нарушении прав русскоязычного населения. *Междурадная* жизнь, Москва, 7–8, 2004, с. 213.

⁴⁶ Черниченко С., Собития в Прибалтике 1940 года как предлог для дискриминации русскоязычного населения, ор.сіt., с. 64.

⁴⁷ Черниченко С. Об "Оккупации" Прибалтики и нарушении прав русскоязычного населения, ор.сіt., с. 213.

⁴⁸ Lēbers D.A., Latvijas neatkarības atjaunošanas prasības dažos dokumentos pirms 1990.gada 4.maija. Jundža T. redakcija, *4.maijs. Rakstu, atmiņu un dokumentu krājums par Neatkarības deklarāciju*, Fonds Latvijas vēsture, Rīga, 2000. 27.-32.lpp., 29.lpp.

⁴⁹ Черниченко С., Собития в Прибалтике 1940 года как предлог для дискриминации русскоязычного населения, ор.сіт., с. 65.



Latvia as a successor of the LSSR

It follows from the legal construction proposed by Chernichenko that the Baltic States are not only successors of the states having existed before 1940, but also sequels of the Soviet republics.⁵⁰ He is of the opinion that the Baltic States used their rights to self-determination based on the constitutional framework of Soviet law.

In turn, Professor Loeber advances arguments that from the perspective of international law such a viewpoint seems unconvincing although it might seem only natural to assume that the Baltic peoples attempted to attain self-determination in 1991. It would lead us to believe that the people were competent to freely and repeatedly exercise their rights to self-determination. Given such logic, every subsequent occasion of self-determination would supercede the previous one.⁵¹ The Baltic States had already established their independence by exercising their right to self-determination in 1918. It had also been attested by the peace agreements concluded with Russia. The claims of 1940 on joining with the USSR were adopted in violation of constitutional norms as they did not express the wish of the Baltic peoples.

International recognition of annexation of Latvia

Regarding the argument invoked by the Baltic States on international non-recognition of occupation by other states, Chernichenko argues that it would be correct to speak about "some states", stressing that recognition is a declarative instead of legitimizing factor. He particularly stresses the example of Great Britain, which recognised *de facto* incorporation of the Baltic States in the USSR, considering that it means an official recognition⁵².

According to Chernichenko, *de facto recognition* is a provisionary measure. A country recognises the actual situation but holds its rights to recall recognition or decide on the continuation of recognition later. Even *de iure* recognition may be recalled. In addition, recognition by one state does not influence the action of others.

Chernichenko also refers to the Final Act of 1975 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has named among other things the principle of frontier non-violation. Thus, according to him, the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR had been confirmed, as it was considered a compromise upon which the entire system of international law was based.⁵³

Regarding the document of 1975 of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Chernichenko has not taken into account the history of preparing the document and the conclusion that states resolve to observe the right to self-determination of nations. In addition, the international community entrusted Russia with the obligation to eliminate the consequences of violation committed by the USSR. This referred not only to the withdrawing of its army but also of property and archives. Russia agreed to these liabilities when joining the Council of Europe⁵⁴.

⁵⁰ Черниченко С., Собития в Прибалтике 1940 года как предлог для дискриминации русскоязычного населения, ор.сіт., с. 66.

⁵¹ Loeber, D.A. Legal Consequences of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact for the Baltic States on the Obligation 'to Overcome the Problems Inherited from the Past'. In: *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, Kluwer Law International, Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 121–166, 128.

⁵² Черниченко С. Об "Оккупации" Прибалтики и нарушении прав русскоязычного населения, ор.сі., с. 218.

⁵³ Черниченко С. Об "Оккупации" Прибалтики и нарушении прав русскоязычного населения, ор. cit., с. 218.

⁵⁴ In 1998 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation No 1392 regarding the embassy buildings in France and Italy that used to belong to the Baltic states, demanding that Russian Federation resolve the issue of their ownership. Report by Goran Magnusson, see: Former embassies of the Baltic states on the territory of some Council of Europe member states. http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc98/rdoc8176.htm. The above liability has been included also in the resolution on admittance of RF to EC : "to settle outstanding international border disputes according to the principles of international law, abiding by the existing international treaties" and "to settle rapidly all issues related to the return of property claimed by Council of Europe member states, in particular the archives transferred to Moscow in 1945", Parliamentary Assembly Opinion No. 193 (1996) on Russia's request for membership of the Council of Europe. Available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA96/Eopi193.htm. Viewed on 02.01.2005.



A concluding remark

Although in the international law of 1940 there existed a limited regulation regarding the use of violence and the threat of violence in international relations, it is clear that the USSR violated its bilateral and multilateral international obligations and liabilities. Therefore the claim of Latvia on the continuation of the state is legitimate. All states and international organisations have recognized this both during the occupation and after it.

The Russian Federation is considered to be the legal successor of the Soviet Union. This means that the international liabilities of the USSR are binding to Russia, too, including responsibility for its violations of international obligations stipulated by international law⁵⁵.

⁵⁵ Ziemele, I. State Continuity, Succession and Responsibility: Reparation to the Baltic States and their Peoples? In: *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, Kluwer Law International, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 165–189, 180. See also: Ziemele, I. Is the Distinction between State Continuity and State Succession Reality or Fiction? The Russian Federation, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Germany. In: *Baltic Yearbook of International Law*, Kluwer Law International, Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 194–202, 191.

Chapter 3

Mass Media on the 1940 events in Latvia

Background

Information provided by mass media of Latvia on the events of 1940 should be analysed in a wider historical context, by marked the attitude of the Soviet rule towards mass media. This attitude was shaped by the Soviet political regime under the ruling communist ideology and its historical interpretations. Although the Soviet regime had common informative goals, a split of the public space was developed in Latvia during the Soviet period, which expressed itself in ideological differences (the idea of working class revolution prevailed in the Latvian language media, the Russian language media discussed historical issues on a considerably narrower scale, or ignored them). Split in media also expressed itself via their users' language – Latvian and Russian (according to official data, about 70% of residents other than Latvians did not know the Latvian language or did not know it well enough to be able to follow media).

During the Soviet period, the events of 1940, as a result of which Latvia became a part of the USSR, were almost never mentioned in Russian media; consequently, Russian-speaking residents could have developed an opinion that Latvia had always been a part of the USSR. The effect was even intensified by the fact that only politically oriented Russian language media were available in Latvia during the entire Soviet period, but there were no interest media that would have provided wider notions about human life stories, attitudes and values in the closed model of Soviet ideology. Thus, people who did not know the Latvian language were dissociated from the Latvian-speaking inhabitants of Latvia and kept under the impression of all-embracing propaganda means of the Soviet Union. Media attitudes towards historical issues during the Soviet times were also marked by social differences of society groups.

In turn, during the Soviet times, the events of 1940 were interpreted in media, printed and broadcasted in Latvian, as the working class socialist revolution, which did not have a corresponding confirmation in individual historical experience of people, and consequently, it was an event of little importance to people, in comparison with, for example, mass deportations in the years 1941 and 1949, which, being a historical event, were concealed in the public sphere, but widely and continuously maintained in the private sphere – stories about family biographies told to children, lack of information about relatives' fates.

Already in the Soviet times, Latvian and Russian media developed essential mutual differences regarding disclosure and interpretation of historical issues. Such a gap in knowledge developed by the Soviet regime was purposefully sustained by the authorities of the time between the part of the society, which knew only Russian, on the one hand, and Latvian and Russian, on the other hand. Those groups of today's Latvian society, which arrived to live in Latvia from various parts of the Soviet Union were completely isolated from the Latvian information environment due to lack of knowledge of the local language, subjugated to the Soviet centralised propaganda and consequently, due to lack of information, were not able to evaluate critically the situations and make their individual conclusions. It was greatly due to this particular policy and media segmentation that the fast exchange of information on history of Latvia caused confusion and even rebuff in a considerable part of population (mostly in the groups, that had arrived in Latvia in the period between 1960-1985 and did not know Latvian), as the reference points of values and information that had dominated in the media before, had been lost in the historical discourse. The notions of individual history maintained in the Latvian society permitted the Latvian language media much easier to get loose of the communist ideology principles and to adapt for democratic manifestations of public opinion after political changes in the USSR under conditions of information publicity.

Characteristics of media regarding occupation issues

Four major daily newspapers in Latvian and Russian were sampled for media search. Considering the media environment in Latvia, these were particularly the printed daily newspapers that corresponded most precisely to criteria of comparative analysis. Of Latvian press, only the newspapers *Diena* and *Latvijas Avīze*, and of Russian publications only the newspapers *Hac* and *Becmu Cerodhs* were analysed.

In total, the issue of the occupation of Latvia has been directly mentioned 105 times in the major printed media during 2004. The proportion of its reflection in Latvian and Russian printed media was 70% and 30%, respec-



tively. Direct reflection of the issue of occupation means that the aim of the articles was to draw attention to the issues and problems of history. This issue has been reflected in Latvian press also in relation to various Latvia anniversaries, mass deportations of 1941 and 1949, holocaust, the Latvian legion, and Soviet partisans. In Russian press, topics related to WWII, defeat of Nazi Germany and the USSR victory have been dominating.

Indirectly (in context with other problems) the issue of occupation in Latvian press is related to the foreign policy of the state, current international relations, guidelines of political parties, ethnic relations, and education policy. The range of issues indirectly related to occupation is wide and manifold, which proves the topicality of the problem in society. While, for instance, thematic articles on Latvia's quest for freedom, for freedom, establishment of the state, or repressions are published in relation to particular dates (18 November, 11 November, 14 June, 25 March), occupation topics are equally important throughout the year, moreover, in a large variety of texts.

Compared to 2004, during the first two months of this year, issues of occupation, related to actualization of particular foreign policy issues of Latvia, drew a considerably wider attention of the society. These issues include: relations between Latvia and Russia, the commemoration ceremony of WWII in Moscow, the frontier treaty between Latvia and Russia, as well as international explanation of Latvia history.

The printed media of the Latvian and Russian languages show mutually contradictory attitudes in their publications. The estimation of Latvian newspapers is unequivocally negative regarding incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union; in turn, the Russian press stresses the positive consequences of this fact. Both Latvian and Russian media are trying to maintain polarised positions in relation to the issue of occupation, which is manifested in regular references to opinions expressed in other newspapers, which media interpret according to their own views and convictions afterwards.

The views on the occupation process differ in media, too. In Latvian press, an opinion predominates that the occupation of Latvia was illegitimate; in turn, Russian publications appeal to the public opinion and the support policy of the pre-war government. Another contradictory issue is related to the necessity of evaluating the 1949 events in Latvia. Latvian press stands for the necessity to evaluate occupation at a political level. Russian press maintains an opposing conviction, namely, that any evaluation of this issue means heating hostility directed towards other nationalities of Latvia.

Topic of occupation in media

During 2004, quite a lot of attention in Latvian media has been paid to various anniversaries and organised activities related to the fact of occupation. Historians' comments and opinions related to celebration of a particular event are very common in media. Regarding occupation, in Latvian printed media, attention is paid to various activities, events and undertakings related to historical subjects. From the perspective of Latvian media, the issue of occupation is closely related to the internal political life of the state. It refers both to ideological orientation of political parties as well as to politicians' attitudes towards various issues (educational reform, relations between the minorities, etc.)

In Latvian printed media, great attention is paid to the issue of occupation in relation to the foreign policy of Latvia. It refers both to relationship between Latvia and Russia, and participation of Latvia in international organizations. Particularly great attention is paid to special cases at the European Court of Human Rights that are politically related to the history of Latvia.

The Russian press published in Latvia tried to give its own interpretations of several events in 2004 regarding the issue of occupation, although more attention was paid to connection of these events with the current political problems. Great attention was paid to statements and evaluations made by politicians and officials of Russia with regard to occupation in the Russian printed press. In both of the Russian language newspapers published in Latvia, subjects concerning occupation are touched upon in various interviews with politicians and officials from Russia. The Russian press of Latvia augments the positions of politicians and officials from Russia on historical issues in Latvia. Russian newspapers published in Latvia precisely reflect official announcements of Russia regarding interpretations of history.

The major conclusions published by the Russian newspapers in Latvia in 2004 can be summarized as follows:

- The problems of history are artificial;
- Latvians supported the USSR, they built communism side by side;

- Occupation was carried out with the assistance of the government of Latvia, there was no resistance, because the people did not like president Ulmanis' regime;
- Great Britain recognized joining of Latvia with the USSR;
- The USSR liberated Latvia from fascism;
- Russians suffered from the USSR, too;

• Discussions on occupation are advantageous for Latvian nationalists in relation to internal policy.

The Russian newspapers periodically publish viewpoints that there has never been any occupation in Latvia. Such rhetorical statements draw attention of Latvian media, which present and interpret them in a grotesque manner. Some politicians take advantage of this situation, who seek for political support of foreigners and thus try to popularise their names.

Evaluation of media information

Generally, media of Latvia are highly appreciated by the society. Latvian media usually take one of the three places among the most popular institutions, establishments and organisations. This means that the information provided by and reflected in media meets the requirements of society. Taking into account the content of the 1940 events from the perspective of internal policy, external policy and history, media also react and develop the aforementioned subjects corresponding to the interests of its target audience. Considering the different spaces and audiences of media in Latvia, which have already been established historically, the topic of the 1940 events in Latvian and Russian printed media do not overlap. Splitting of the informative environment to a certain extent limits the awareness of the society in general. The interest of the middle and senior generations regarding media is satisfied by one or another publication, while people of the younger generation, on the contrary, show considerably less interest in this sphere; therefore, the level of awareness is estimated as critical.

Sociological investigations prove that the attitude of the society towards the 1940 events and their impact on Latvia is not united. This can be explained to a great extent by the above-mentioned historical split into Russian and Latvian informative space, where a considerable part of society has received only the centralised propaganda information on Soviet times. After changes and regaining of the national independence, the ruling concepts of the 1940 events reflected in Latvian media have not been explained and interpreted in the Russian media space. Under the conditions of such separation, the political attitudes of Russia towards Latvia and historical events prevail in the Russian language media.

Also, the sociological survey, which will be described in more detail in the following chapter, shows that about one-fifth of Latvia's inhabitants evaluate positively the fact that Latvia came under the influence sphere of the USSR, but 23% are neutral towards it. About one fourth of Latvia's inhabitants bear the opinion that the state has joined the USSR on a voluntary basis. This opinion is also expressed by Russian printed media in Latvia, and it corresponds to the interests of their target audience regarding this issue.

About 40% of Latvia's inhabitants are personally interested in discussions about the 1940 events. Furthermore, one-third of people consider that discussions of historical issues are vital to the society of Latvia. The interest of society in these issues is stimulated by mass media. Taking into account the current urgency to evaluate historical, the development of media space in Latvia will become of great importance. With the environment becoming more global and oriented towards European values, scale of the discussion may widen from Latvian to Russian and from Russian to Latvian publications.

Chapter 4

Public opinion on issues related to the 1940 events in Latvia

Analysis of the 1940 events, as a result of which Latvia became a constituent part of the USSR, is important for Latvia both when evaluating its relations with other states, as their action or lack of action is considered to be a cause for loss of state independence for 50 years, and while implementing the policy of society integration in Latvia, as different interpretation of historical events in different groups of society is a hindrance to the unity of society.

Therefore, not only historical and legal aspects of these events have to be estimated, but also the public opinion, knowledge and interest about them. Overview of the perspectives of various social groups of Latvia is necessary both, when analysing the current policy, and taking decisions in the future.

Publications in different mass media serve as evidence to the fact that interpretations of the year 1940 differ in various society groups. In addition, considerable distinctions can be observed in reflection of these events by newspapers published in the Latvian and Russian languages, which make one conclude, that the borderline in interpretation of historical events is greatly related to affiliation with different ethnic groups.

When analysing facts, which might have influenced the attitudes of ethnic groups towards the events of 1940, it should be indicated that the historical connection of these groups with Latvia differ. Although the Latvian society historically has been multiethnic, the statistical data prove that in the period after WWII (i.e., during the time when Latvia was a part of the USSR) the ethnic composition of its residents has essentially changed (see Annex 5).

Characteristics of the study

In order to elicit the attitude of Latvian society towards the events of 1940, a representative survey of inhabitants of Latvia was carried out on these issues in December 2004. The main aim of the study was to evaluate the overall public attitude towards 1940 events, as well as public interest and knowledge regarding these events. Another goal of the study was to find out how the Latvian society reflects on the legal and historical aspects of the topic – whether the way how Latvia became a part of the USSR was considered legitimate (corresponding to international legal provisions), and to what extent loss of independence of Latvia was considered to be a result of internal or external forces.

Awareness

As part of the study the inhabitants were asked to characterise their awareness both of the previously mentioned 1940 events and of Jalta conference in 1945, where the USSR, Great Britain and the USA agreed on the influence zones in Europe.

The survey proves that the inhabitants of Latvia **evaluate rather critically** their awareness of the historical events analysed in the study: only 12% point out that they *"are well informed"* of the respective 1940 events, and 7% consider that they *"are well informed"* of the events of Jalta conference in 1945. However, 53% of residents indicated that they were *"generally informed, but not aware of details"* about the events of 1940, but 35% indicated this regarding the Jalta conference.

When comparing the answers by ethnic Latvians to those of representatives of other ethnicities, it may be observed that the latter estimate their knowledge about the 1940 events more critically: 15% of Latvians and 7% of non-Latvians indicated that they *"are well informed"* of the events or they are *"generally informed, but are not aware of details"* (58% and 46%, respectively). Interestingly, the answers of both groups differ less when estimating their knowledge about the Jalta conference. According to the data of the survey, younger inhabitants, women, and respondents with a lower education level have estimated their knowledge more critically if compared to the average evaluation. (*For more detailed results see Annex 8, charts 8 a and 9 a*)



Evaluation

In order to characterise the public opinion about the events of 1940, the respondents were asked to evaluate the very fact that Latvia became a part of the USSR, legitimacy of the event in conformity with international legal provisions, and the influence of external and internal factors on those events.

The survey data prove that the **society does not have a unitary opinion when evaluating the events of 1940** and their influence on Latvia. According to the survey data, half of the inhabitants of Latvia evaluate as negative the very fact that Latvia became a part of the USSR (29% evaluate it as *"very negative"*, 21% as *"rather negative"*), 23% have chosen the evaluation *"neutral"*, but 18% of respondents consider that it should be estimated as positive (5% have provided the answer *"very positive"* and 13% *"rather positive"*).

The opinion about the way how Latvia became a part of the USSR also differed, 47% of respondents considered that the 1940 events could be characterised as invasion of the USSR into Latvia, while 24% indicated that joining the USSR was a voluntary decision taken by Latvia.

Legitimacy of the process of incorporating Latvia into the USSR is also estimated discordantly: more than a half of the surveyed (57%) pointed out that it did not happen legitimately (in accordance with the international legal provisions), but 16% indicated that the process corresponded to these norms. It should be noted that over 1/4 of the respondents (27%) refrained from evaluation of the legitimacy of the process.

According to the survey data, the answers of Latvians and non-Latvians differed regarding these issues: Latvians had a more negative attitude towards the fact that Latvia was incorporated into the USSR, they admitted more often than non-Latvians that it happened as a result of the USSR invasion and was not a voluntary decision by Latvia to join the USSR. Latvians also indicated more often that joining had not happened according to the international legal provisions. (*For more detailed results see Annex 8, charts 1a, 2a, 3a*).

More detailed information was collected **on respondents' opinions about the conditions, under which Latvia became a part of the USSR**.

Most of the respondents (56%) **considered that Latvia could not maintain its national independence in 1940.** When asked to justify their view, the respondents most often indicated that Latvia and its army were too small and weak to resist the superpowers. Comparatively, often it was pointed out that the political situation in the world also had influenced its loss of independence – the USSR and Nazi Germany had concluded an agreement, the war had started in Europe, other states and the League of Nations refrained to interfere in the relations between the USSR and Latvia, and also, the Baltic States were not yet united. A part of the surveyed indicated that Latvia could not maintain its independence as a result of internal processes, which were determined by the policy of the president of Latvia Karlis Ulmanis and his government. It was also mentioned that part of the public at that time was not satisfied with the social situation in the country and actually supported Latvia's joining the USSR.

However, nearly 1/4 of the surveyed (23%) expressed their view that Latvia could have maintained its independence. They considered that the situation could have developed differently, if Latvia had resisted the invaders and the politicians of Latvia had acted differently. Finland was frequently mentioned as an example of a country that decided to fight and maintained its independence.

By comparing answers given by representatives from different ethnic groups, one may conclude that Latvians were not more optimistic than representatives of other ethnic groups about the chances of Latvia to maintain its independence in 1940. Only 26% of the surveyed Latvians and 19% of non-Latvians agreed with the opinion that independence could have been maintained. (*For more detailed see Annex 8, chart 5 a*).

The respondents' conviction that **the events of 1940 in Latvia were mostly determined by external factors** appears also in the answers to other questions. For example, more than a half of residents (56%) considered that **the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact**, concluded in 1939, **was a precondition** for incorporation of Latvia into the USSR, and only 16% indicate that other factors were more significant.

Among the **most influential persons** mentioned in connection with the events of 1940 in Latvia were I. Stalin (30%), K. Ulmanis (president of Latvia) (24%) and A. Hitler (14%). Noteworthily, the survey participants more frequently mentioned foreign politicians instead of Latvian ones, and the most often named foreign politicians

were the representatives of the USSR and Nazi Germany (I. Stalin, A. Hitler, V. Molotov, J. Ribbentrop, A. Vishinsky a.o.). Incidentally, the leaders of the USA and Great Britain, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill were also named.

Interest

As one of the project goals was to incite a discussion about the events of 1940 in Latvia, the **interest of people** about the events was evaluated as well. Respondents were asked to characterise how topical discussion of these issues seemed to them, whether they themselves would be interested in discussions of these events and how they estimated the influence of such discussions on integrity of society. The inhabitants of Latvia were also asked to assess at what forums the 1940 events should be evaluated.

The survey data prove that **less than a half of inhabitants of Latvia admitted their interest into discussions** touching upon the aforementioned historical events. 38% of respondents admitted that they had a **personal inter-est in discussions** about the 1940 events in Latvia, but 40% of respondents indicated that they were interested into discussions about the processes at the end of WWII, which influenced the destiny of Latvia.

When comparing answers by different socio-demographic groups, one may observe that men, elderly people, respondents with a higher educational level and also Latvians have more often admitted interest into these discussions. (*For more detailed results see Annex 8, chart 10 a*).

The fact that less than 1/3 of the inhabitants of Latvia (31%) consider the discussion of the year 1940 events to be topical for Latvian society is also an evidence of what the public attitude is. It should be noted though that unwillingness to speak about these issues is an evidence not only of lack of interest, but also of suspicion that discussions of these issues could stimulate conflicts in society: the survey data prove that 17% of the respondents consider that discussions about the 1940 events could stimulate the unity of society, but 35% indicated that they could reduce the unity of society (32% answered that these discussions would not influence the unity).

When comparing answers of various ethnic groups, one may observe that Latvians more often than non-Latvians have indicated that these issues are topical (44% and 15%, respectively) and have admitted less often that the discussions could reduce unity of society (32% and 48%, respectively). (For more details see Annex 8, chart 12 a).

When characterizing **who should evaluate the events of 1940 in Latvia**, respondents most often named **historians of Latvia** (32%), which can be seen as evidence that the public wishes to establish a "scientific" viewpoint of the events. Other local forums are mentioned less often: 24% indicated the necessity of evaluating these events in the Latvian society, but the government and the Parliament of Latvia (Saeima) have been named even less often – these have been noted by 12% and 8% of residents, respectively. An opinion is expressed comparatively often that these events should be estimated internationally. About 1/4 of the respondents have indicated that it should be done by an intergovernmental working group of Latvia–Russia (26%) and the European Parliament (24%), but 19% have named the UN.

As interpretation of the year 1940 events is one of the most sensitive issues in Latvian–Russian relations; residents were asked to express their attitude: how important they considered the estimation of the 1940 events, **while establishing relations with Russia**. In accordance with the survey data, 18% of the inhabitants considered this issue to be one of the most important in bilateral negotiations, but 24% indicated that it should not be discussed at all. Majority of surveyed had more moderate views – 34% answered that these issues were to be discussed, although they should not be looked upon as the main issue, but 18% indicated that it *"may be discussed and may not be discussed.*"

The survey data indicate that the opinions of Latvians and non-Latvians differ: 28% of Latvians and 6% of non-Latvians indicate that these issues *"must be discussed*", but 14% of Latvians and 37% of non-Latvians consider that they *"should not be discussed at all*". (For more detailed results see Annex 8 chart 7a).

Conclusions

The survey disclosed that in general the events of 1940 in Latvia were considered to be a result of external processes, over which Latvia and its politicians had little influence. Regarding the evaluation of the events in pres-



ent situation, a relatively great part of the inhabitants of Latvia consider that discussions should take place at international forums.

Nevertheless, the survey data prove the necessity of these discussions in the society of Latvia. This can be concluded from the unfavourable estimation regarding the respondents' own knowledge of the events, and the fact that opinions about these issues differ among various society groups (Latvians and non-Latvians, for example). The discussion is especially essential, because without an integrated public opinion regarding these issues there exists a risk that in certain political situations interpretation of these events might become an object of political manipulations.

Annexes

Annex 1

Treaty of Nonaggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement:

Article I

Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other either individually or jointly with other powers.

Article II

Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.

Article III

The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

Article IV

Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

Article V

Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

Article VI

The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

Article VII

The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, 23 August 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Ribbentrop

V. Molotov

Secret Additional Protocol

人名英格兰 医白细胞 医白细胞

On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilnius area is recognized by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in the areas.

4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, 23 August 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

V. Ribbentrop

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. Molotov

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Announcement of the USSR government to the government of Latvia.

[16 June 1940]

Based on the factual material being at disposal of the Soviet government and also on exchange of opinions, which took place recently in Moscow between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Peoples Commissaries and Lithuania's President of Ministers Merkis, the Soviet government considers to be established that the government of Latvia not only has not liquidated the military union with Estonia founded before conclusion of the Soviet – Latvian mutual assistance pact and turned against the USSR, but has also expanded it by drawing Lithuania in this union and is trying to involve also Finland into it.

Until conclusion of the Soviet–Latvian mutual assistance pact in autumn of 1939 the Soviet government could have still turned a blind eye to existence of such a military union, although it was in its terms contradictory to the previously concluded nonaggression pact between the USSR and Latvia. But after having concluded the Soviet–Latvian mutual assistance pact the Soviet government considers existence of the military union among Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania turned against the USSR to be not only inadmissible and unendurable, but also very dangerous and threatening with respect to security of the USSR frontiers.

The Soviet government considered that after conclusion of the Soviet-Latvian mutual assistance pact Latvia would dissolve the military union with the other Baltic States and consequently the military union would be liquidated. Nevertheless Latvia together with other Baltic States has been involved in revival of the aforementioned military union and its extension, which is proven by such facts as convocation of two secret conferences of the Baltic States in December 1939 and March 1940, to establish formally the enlarged military union with Estonia and Lithuania; enhancement of communication among the general headquarters of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which is kept secret from the USSR; establishment of a special press unit of the military Baltic entante in February 1940 – *Revue Baltique*, which is published in English, French and German in Tallinn, and the like.

All these facts bear witness that the government of Latvia has brutally violated the Soviet–Latvian pact of mutual assistance, which forbids "to establish any unions or participate in coalitions turned against one of the agreement parties" (Clause 4 of the pact) to both parties.

This brutal violation of the Soviet–Latvian pact of mutual assistance on the side of the Latvian government takes place at the time when the Soviet Union has followed and continues to follow a highly favourable, definitely prolatvian policy, precisely meeting all requirements of the Soviet–Latvian mutual assistance pact.

The Soviet government concludes that it cannot tolerate any longer this situation.

The USSR government considers the following to be absolutely necessary and urgent:

(1) to establish immediately a government in Latvia, which would be able and ready to provide an honest implementation of the Soviet - Latvian mutual assistance pact into life;

(2) to provide without delay an undisturbed entrance of the Soviet army units in the territory of Latvia in order to locate them in the most important centres of Latvia in such quantities that would be sufficient to secure conditions for implementation of the Soviet and Latvian mutual assistance pact and prevent possible provocative acts against the Soviet garrison in Latvia.

The Soviet government considers fulfilment of these requirements to be an elementary condition without which it would not be possible to achieve an honest and loyal execution of the Soviet–Latvian mutual assistance pact.

The Soviet government will wait for an answer from the government of Latvia until 11 p.m. of 16 June. Nondelivery of the answer by the Latvian government until this term will be considered a refusal to meet the aforementioned requirements of the Soviet Union.



Minutes No. 40 of the meeting of Latvia Cabinet of Ministers

[16 June 1940]

Present:

President of Ministers	Dr. K. Ulmanis
Minister of Foreign Affairs	V. Munters
Minister of Home Affairs	K. Veidnieks
Minister of War	Gen. K. Berkis
Minister of Transport	A. Kāposts
Minister of Justice	H. Apsīts
Ministry of Trade and Commerce	J. Blumbergs
Minutes taken by:	
Substitute to Director of State Chancellery	R. Bulsons
Meeting starts at 19.00.	

(1) Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Munters reports about the ultimatum, which the Chairman of the USSR Council of Commissaries has submitted to Latvian ambassador in Moscow at 14.00 on 16 June 1940 (13.00 Latvian time).

(2) Agree to accept the requirement of the Soviet Union government on admitting additional units of army into Latvia.

(3) Agree to notify the State President on resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers and consider this decision to be immediately submitted to the State President Kārlis Ulmanis.

The meeting is closed at 22.00.

President of Ministers K. Ulmanis

Substitute to Director of State Chancellery R. Bulsons

Table 1 "Changes in Ethnic Structure of Latvia" (1935-2004)

	1935	5	1959		1970	0	1979	6	1989		2000		2004	4
	number	%	number 8%	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
All population	1905936 100	100	2093458 100	100	2364127	100	2502816 100	100	2666567	100	2377383	100	2319203	100
Latvians	1467035 77.0	0.77	1297881	62.0	1341805	56.8	1344105	53.7	1387757	52.0	1370703	57.7	1359582	58.6
Russians	168266	8.8	556448	26.6	704599	29.8	821464	32.8	905515	34.0	703243	29.6	668887	28.8
Belarussians	26803	1.4	61587	2.9	94898	4.0	111505	4.5	119702	4.5	97150	4.1	89984	3.9
Ukrainians	1844	0.1	29440	1.4	53461	2.3	66703	2.7	92101	3.5	63644	2.7	59860	2.6
Poles	48637	2.6	59774	2.9	63045	2.7	62690	2.5	60416	2.3	59505	2.5	57227	2.5
Lithuanians	22843	1.2	32383	1.5	40589	1.7	37818	1.5	34630	1.3	33430	1.4	32045	1.4
Others	170508	8.9	55945	2.7	65730	2.8	58531	2.3	66446	2.5	49708	2.1	51618	2.2

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of LR, Results of the 2000 Population and housing census in Latvia, 2000 and Statistics Yearbook of Latvia, 2004.

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Technical Information of the Survey

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SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED BY	Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre SKDS
POPULATION	Permanent residents of Latvia at the age of 18 to 74
PLANNED SAMPLE SIZE	1000 respondents (representative sample of the general population)
REACHED SAMPLE SIZE	1011 respondents
SAMPLING METHOD	Stratified random sampling
STRATIFICATION FEATURES	Administrative, territorial, national
RESEARCH METHOD	Personal (face-to-face) interviews at the places of residence
	of the respondents
GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE	All regions of Latvia (102 sampling points)
TIME OF SURVEY	From 4 December 2004 to 18 December 2004

Annex 7

Survey Questionnaire

The following questions will be about the history of Latvia. These questions are necessary for a scientific study about the attitude of society towards the events of 1940 in Latvia, which resulted in incorporation of Latvia into the USSR. I would like to remind you that there are no right or wrong answers, it is very important for us to know exactly your opinion about these issues!

1. What is your evaluation of the fact that Latvia became a part of the USSR? Is it ...?

..very positive ..rather positive ..neutral ..rather negative ..very negative Hard to say/NA

1 2

3 4

5

8

2. Do you think that incorporation of Latvia into the USSR in 1940 was legitimate (corresponding to international legal provisions)?

Yes 1 No 2 Hard to say/NA 8

3. Which of these statements, in your opinion, most precisely describes the way, how Latvia became a part of the USSR in 1940? It was ... (*Mark one answer only*!)

Voluntary decision of Latvia to join with the USSR	1
Invasion of the USSR into Latvia	2
Other (indicate, what exactly)	3
Hard to say/NA	8

4. Did the agreement concluded between Nazi Germany – the USSR in 1939 (Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) affected the fact that Latvia became a part of the USSR in 1940? Which of these statements mostly correspond to your opinion?

This agreement was a prerequisite for Latvia's incorporation into the USSR	1
There were other factors that more influenced Latvia's incorporation into the USSR	2
Other answer (<i>please</i> , <i>specify</i>)	3
Hard to say/NA	8



5. In your opinion, who are the most important persons when speaking about the events of 1940 in Latvia, which resulted in incorporation of Latvia into the USSR (i.e., which persons mostly influenced these events)?

1.	
2.	
3.	

6. In your opinion, was Latvia able to maintain its national independence in 1940? It...

Certainly, was able	1
Rather was able	2
Rather was not able	3
Certainly was not able	4
Hard to say/NA	8

7. Why do you think so? (Please, explain your answer to the previous question, describe the conditions, which you think determined it!)

1.	
2.	
3	

8. The following question touches upon necessity to evaluate the events of 1940 in Latvia. In your opinion,

is it necessary to evaluate these events...? (Mark all the appropriate answers!) Hand out card 8!

in the circles of historians of Latvia	1
by society of Latvia	2
by the Parliament of Latvia	3
by the government of Latvia	4
by the European Parliament	5
by the United Nations (UN)	6
by the intergovernmental working group of Latvia - Russia	7
By other (please, specify)	8
There is no need to evaluate these events	9
Hard to say/NA	98

9. The following question is about the way, how Latvia should act, regarding the events of 1940, <u>when form-ing relationships with Russia</u>. Please, indicate, which of the suggestions mostly corresponds to your position? *Hand out card 9!*

Evaluation of the events of 1940 should be one of the major issues in	
negotiations between Latvia and Russia	1
These issues have to be discussed, but their evaluation is not one of the	
major issues in negotiations between Latvia and Russia	2
These issues may be and may not be discussed	3
These issues should not be discussed at all, when forming relations between Latvia and Russia	4
Hard to say/NA	8

10. In your opinion, is discussion of the 1940 events in Latvia currently topical for society of Latvia (i.e., should they be spoken of, discussed)?

It certainly is topical	1
It is rather topical	2
It is rather not topical	3
It is certainly not topical	4
Hard to say/NA	8

11. Please, characterise how informed you are about the events of 1940, which resulted in incorporation of Latvia into the USSR?

Well informed	1
Generally informed, but is not aware of details	2
Has heard about them, but is not aware of details	3
Has not heard	4
Hard to say/NA	8

$1 \leq 1 \leq n \leq $			
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12. Please, characterize how informed you are about the conference of 1945 in Jalta, where the USSR, Great Britain and the USA agreed on the zones of influence in Europe after World War II?

Well informed	1
Generally informed, but is not aware of details	2
Has heard about them, but is not aware of details	3
Has not heard	4
Hard to say/NA	8

13. Do you have an interest in discussions about the events of 1940 in Latvia?

Very interested	1
Rather interested	2
Rather not interested	3
Completely not interested	4
Hard to say/NA	8

14. Do you have an interest in discussions about the events in the end of war (years 1944–1945), which influenced the destiny of Latvia?

Very interested	1
Rather interested	2
Rather not interested	3
Completely not interested	4
Hard to say/NA	8

15. In your opinion, will discussions of the events of 1940 in Latvia influence integrity of Latvian society?

They will certainly influence integrity of society	1
They will rather influence integrity of society	2
They will rather not influence integrity of society	3
They will rather reduce integrity of society	4
They will certainly reduce integrity of society	5
Hard to say/NA	8



Chart 1





Chart 1a









Chart 2 a



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



Chart 3a



Answers to the question 'Did the agreement concluded between Nazi Germany - the USSR in 1939 (Molotov - R ibbentrop Pact) affected the fact that Latvia became a part of the USSR in 1940? Which of these statements mostly correspond to your opinion?' (all respondents, n=1011) (12.2004.) (%)

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



Chart 4a

Answers to the question 'Did the agreement concluded between Nazi Germany the USSR in 1939 (Molotov - Ribbentrop Pact) affected the fact that Latvia became a part of the USSR in 1940? Which of these statements mostly correspond to your opinion?': comparison of answers of different socio-demographic groups (all respondents, n=1011) (12.2004.) (%)








Chart 5a









Chart 7a



Evaluation of the events of 1940 should be one of the major issues in negotiations between Latvia and Russia

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



Chart 8a



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



Chart 9a







Chart 10a



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



Chart 11a







Chart 12a



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



Chart 13a



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